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King v. Burwell and the Triumph of 
Selective Contextualism
Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon*
I am altering the deal. Pray I don’t alter it any further.1
Introduction
King v. Burwell presented the question of whether the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) authorizes the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to issue tax credits for the purchase of health 
insurance through exchanges established by the federal govern-
ment. The King plaintiffs alleged an IRS rule purporting to autho-
rize tax credits in federal exchanges was unlawful because the text 
of the ACA expressly authorizes tax credits only in exchanges “es-
tablished by the State.” Led by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Su-
preme Court conceded the plain meaning of the operative text, and 
that Congress defined “State” to exclude the federal government. 
The Court nevertheless disagreed with the plaintiffs, explaining 
that “the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart from 
what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent 
statutory phrase.”2 Voting 6–3, the Court effectively rewrote the 
*  Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and director of the Center 
for Business Law & Regulation at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
Cannon is director of health policy studies at the Cato Institute. The authors were 
intimately involved in King v. Burwell and related litigation. They were the first to 
publicly question the lawfulness of the disputed IRS rule, developed many of the legal 
arguments raised in the resulting legal challenges, and filed multiple amicus curiae 
briefs in King and related cases. The authors thank Andrew Peterson for his research 
assistance.
1  Star Wars: Episode V - The Empire Strikes Back (Lucasfilm 1980).
2  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015).
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statutory text in order to ensure the ACA would “improve health 
insurance markets, not . . . destroy them.”3
King was the Supreme Court’s third ACA case in four years. In 
2012, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the act in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, but only after rejecting 
a Commerce Clause justification for the individual mandate (con-
struing it instead to be a use of the taxing power) and eliminating 
the requirement that states must implement the ACA’s Medicaid ex-
pansion in order to keep receiving federal Medicaid grants.4 Then, 
in 2014, in Hobby Lobby Stores v. Burwell, the Court concluded the 
Obama administration had failed to accommodate religious objec-
tions to the so-called “contraception mandate” as required under the 
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.5 
NFIB saved the ACA, but left the statute scarred. Hobby Lobby re-
buked the Department of Health and Human Services’ implemen-
tation of the new law. By comparison, 2015’s King v. Burwell was a 
resounding victory for the Obama administration. This third trip to 
One First Street was the charm. 
While portions of the Court’s King opinion may constrain agency 
interpretive authority in future cases, the opinion green-lighted the 
administration’s efforts to implement the ACA without regard for 
the limitations contained in the ACA’s text.6 Even if the Court did not 
accept the specific arguments offered by the solicitor general, it gave 
3  Id. at 2496.
4  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). On NFIB see David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Andrew 
M. Grossman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Triumph of Fig-Leaf Federalism, 2011–2012 
Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 31 (2012); James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable 
Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear No-
tice Rule, 2011–2012 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 67 (2012).
5  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the Contraceptive 
Mandate in Hobby Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2013–2014 Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 35 (2014). See also Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (mem.). This 
order generated opinions, but was not a decision on the merits after oral argument.
6  This result is particularly troubling given the administration’s pattern of modify-
ing the meaning of the ACA in the course of implementing it. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Cato Institute and Prof. Josh Blackman in Support of Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 135 
S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); see also Jonathan H. Adler, The Ad Hoc Implementa-
tion and Enforcement of Health Care Reform, in Liberty’s Nemesis (D. Reuter & J. Yoo, 
eds., forthcoming); Grace-Marie Turner, 51 Changes to ObamaCare . . . So Far, Galen 
Institute (June 9, 2015), http://www.galen.org/newsletters/changes-to-obamacare-
so-far. 
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the Obama administration nearly everything it wanted. The Court 
expanded the ACA beyond what its congressional supporters ever 
had the votes to enact. It just had to disregard portions of the ACA’s 
text and selectively consider statutory structure and context to do it.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates, via the ACA’s 
unique legislative history, how having states operate the law’s ex-
changes was an indispensable purpose of the act. The ACA literally 
would not have become law if the federal government were given 
primary responsibility for operating exchanges. Part II explains how 
the statutory language at issue in King is clear, unambiguous, and 
serves that congressional purpose—even if some ACA supporters 
did not know about or approve of that language. Part III discusses 
how and why the IRS departed from the plain meaning of that lan-
guage, and the academic and legal challenges that followed. Part 
IV gives an overview of the Supreme Court’s King decision. Part V 
shows how the majority misused statutory context to find the ACA 
is ambiguous. Part VI shows the Court’s claim that it is “implau-
sible” that Congress intended that language is demonstrably false. 
Part VII discusses the significance of the Court’s decision not to 
apply the Chevron deference-to-agencies doctrine in King. Part VIII 
connects Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to King to his “saving con-
structions” in NFIB v. Sebelius, which together have produced a law 
that is now materially different from Congress’s plan. Part IX offers 
concluding thoughts.
I. State-Run Exchanges: An Essential Part of Congress’s Plan 
After 100 years marked by more failures than successes, advocates 
of universal health insurance coverage were heartened when a wave 
election in 2008 gave Democrats control of the presidency and both 
chambers of Congress. Crucially, one Republican senator’s subse-
quent party switch also gave Democrats a 60-seat, filibuster-proof 
majority in the U.S. Senate that lasted from July 2009 until Janu-
ary 2010.7 The House passed its health care bill in November 2009.8 
The Senate followed suit, passing the ACA—the merged product of 
7  This history is recounted in Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation 
Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under the PPACA, 
23 Health Matrix 119, 124–26 (2013); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Jonathan H. Adler & 
Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
8  Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
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health care bills passed by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP) Committee and the Senate Finance Committee—
on December 24, 2009. The ACA passed the Senate by a vote of 60–39, 
overcoming a GOP filibuster without a vote to spare. 
The ACA’s authors never intended it to become the final bill.9 Their 
goal was simply to marshal 60 votes behind something they could 
later merge with the House bill. A special-election upset put an end 
to such hopes. In January 2010, Massachusetts voters elected Repub-
lican Scott Brown to fill the Senate seat vacated by the death of Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA). Brown’s victory put an end to the Sen-
ate Democrats’ filibuster-proof majority. At that moment, the ACA 
became the only health care bill that could become law, because nei-
ther a House-Senate compromise nor any other bill could overcome 
a GOP filibuster. 
Whatever the ACA’s shortcomings, if Democrats wanted compre-
hensive health care legislation, it would have to be the ACA, because 
voters had blocked them from enacting anything more expansive. 
Despite serious reservations,10 House Democrats approved the ACA 
as-is, making only minor changes through the budget reconciliation 
process, and sent it to the president’s desk. One of those reservations 
would prove significant. 
The ACA employed the basic framework House and Senate Demo-
crats had agreed upon before the legislative process began: Medicaid 
coverage for everyone below a given poverty threshold and heavily 
regulated private health insurance for everyone else. The latter regu-
lations banned discrimination on the basis of pre-existing conditions, 
and then, to combat the resulting instability, both required individu-
als to obtain coverage (an individual mandate) and subsidized pre-
miums for low- and moderate-income households. Economists liken 
this scheme to a three-legged stool because it has the quality that 
without each of those three elements in place, the scheme collapses. 
9  Timothy S. Jost, Yes, the Federal Exchange Can Offer Premium Tax Credits, Health 
Reform Watch Blog (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/09/11/
yes-the-federal-exchange-can-offer-premium-tax-credits (“No one intended the current 
ACA to become the final law. It was the Senate bill, enacted after the House bill, which 
was to go through conference before the final [bill] was enacted.”).
10  See Harold Pollack, 47 (Now 51) Health Policy Experts (Including Me) Say “Sign 
the Senate Bill,” The New Republic (Jan. 22, 2010).
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The ACA differed from the House bill in at least one significant 
respect: it gave states primary responsibility for administering its 
health-insurance “Exchanges,” allowing the federal government to 
operate exchanges only where states failed to do so themselves.11 The 
House bill created a single, nationwide exchange administered by 
the federal government.
Whatever substantive reasons individual Senate Democrats may 
have had for preferring state-run exchanges—for example, local 
control, deflecting criticisms that the ACA was a federal takeover of 
health care12—what matters for our present purposes is that state-
run exchanges were an absolute political necessity. Key Democratic 
senators threatened not to support a final bill unless states oper-
ated the exchanges.13 All other ACA supporters had no choice but 
to relent. Defeating a GOP filibuster required 60 votes, and Senate 
11  See U.S. Rep. Doggett: Settling for Second-Rate Health Care Doesn’t Serve Texans, 
My Harlingen News (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.myharlingennews.com/?p=6426 
(letter from 11 House Democrats to President Obama and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
expressing concern about the ACA and “states with indifferent state leadership that 
are unwilling or unable to administer and properly regulate a health insurance market-
place”); see also Terry Gross, Next Up: Turning Two Health Care Bills into One, Fresh 
Air (WBUR News) (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.wbur.org/npr/122483567 (“GROSS: 
So getting to the exchanges, in the House bill, it’s a national insurance exchange. In 
the Senate bill, it’s state-oriented . . . Mr. COHN: Absolutely, and this is a very impor-
tant difference that frankly has gotten little attention.”). See also Julie Rovner, House, 
Senate View Health Exchanges Differently, NPR (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=122476051.
12  Senate Democratic Policy Comm., Fact Check: Responding to Opponents of 
Health Insurance Reform (Sept. 21, 2009), http://dpc.senate.gov/reform/reform-
factcheck-092109.pdf (“There is no government takeover or control of health care in 
any senate health insurance reform legislation. . . . All the health insurance exchanges, 
which will create choice and competition for Americans’ business in health care, are 
run by states” (emphasis added)).
13  On the Record (Fox News broadcast, Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
story/2010/04/14/sen-ben-nelson-his-side-cornhusker-kickback.html (“I had re-
quirements. The requirements were no government run plan, no federal exchange, 
national exchange, and adequate language to deal with abortion. Those were require-
ments.”). See also Patrick O’Connor & Carrie Brown, Nancy Pelosi’s Uphill Health 
Bill Battle, Politico, Jan. 9, 2010 (“Two key moderates—Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) and 
Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.)—have favored the state-based exchanges over national 
exchanges.”); Reed Abelson, Proposals Clash on States’ Roles in Health Plans, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 13, 2010 (“Senator Ben Nelson, Democrat of Nebraska, is a former gover-
nor, state insurance commissioner and insurance executive who strongly favors the 
state approach. His support is considered critical to the passage of any health care 
bill.”).
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Democrats had no votes to spare. Following Scott Brown’s election, 
no other bill could have cleared Congress. The ACA would not have 
passed without a system of state-run exchanges. This was not only a 
distinct part of Congress’s plan, but indeed a sine qua non of the ACA.
This congressional purpose was neither hidden nor its existence 
in dispute. Democrats in both chambers emphasized the ACA’s ex-
changes would be state-run. They scarcely mentioned the possibility 
of federal exchanges.14 Shortly after enactment, HHS Secretary Kath-
leen Sebelius testified, “I think it will very much be a State-based 
program.”15 President Obama predicted, “by 2014, each state will set 
up what we’re calling a health insurance exchange.”16 They did not 
foresee that 34 states would refuse.
II. Clear Language that Serves a Congressional Purpose
The ACA’s text reflects Congress’s preference for state-run ex-
changes. Section 1311 directs, “Each State shall . . . establish an . . . 
Exchange.”17 Like the Finance and HELP bills, the ACA authorized 
unlimited start-up funds for state-run exchanges.18 To provide an 
incentive for states to establish exchanges, it conditioned renewal 
of those grants on states making progress toward establishing an 
exchange and implementing other parts of the act.19 Like the Fi-
nance and HELP bills, it provided no start-up funding for federal 
exchanges.20 
14  See Adler & Cannon, supra note 7, at 148–50 (reviewing discussion of exchanges 
in the Congressional Record). 
15  Departments of Labor, Health & Human Services, Education, & Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 2011: Hearing Before a Subcomm. on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives, 111th Cong. 171 (Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.). 
16  Remarks on Health Insurance Reform in Portland, Maine, 2010 Daily Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 220 (Apr. 1, 2010).
17  42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1).
18  Id. § 18031(a).
19  Id.
20  In the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Congress did appro-
priate $1 billon “for Federal administrative expenses to carry out [the ACA].” Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1005, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010); but see J. Lester Feder, HHS May Have to Get ‘Creative’ on Exchange, Politico 
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/081161513.html (“The gen-
eral pot of money that the ACA makes available for implementation is surprisingly 
56471_CH03_Adler-Cannon_R3.indd   40 9/3/15   12:44 PM
King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism
41
The statutory language at issue in King likewise serves Congress’s 
purpose of encouraging states to establish exchanges. Section 1401 
of the ACA created a new Internal Revenue Code Section 36B, which 
authorizes refundable “premium-assistance tax credits” for “ap-
plicable taxpayers” who meet certain criteria. One criterion is that 
recipients enroll in coverage “through an Exchange established by 
the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.”21 
Notably, Section 36B’s tax-credit eligibility rules bear no mention 
of exchanges established by the federal government. Indeed, “estab-
lished by the State under Section 1311” twice distinguishes state-
established exchanges from federal exchanges, authority for which 
appears in Section 1321.22 The eligibility rules contain no language 
broadly authorizing credits through “an[y]” exchange, as the ACA 
does with small-business tax credits.23 Instead, Section 36B’s tax-
credit eligibility rules are tightly, even artfully worded. Every refer-
ence to exchanges is to “an Exchange established by the State under 
section 1311.” That requirement appears twice explicitly and seven 
more times by cross-reference.24 Section 36B plainly authorizes tax 
credits solely through state-established exchanges,25 a condition that 
serves Congress’s purpose of encouraging state-run exchanges by 
creating an incentive for states to establish them.
small, given that it is ushering in a series of new regulations covering a sector that 
accounts for a major chunk of the American economy. It only appropriates $1 billion 
for all federal administrative costs. ‘Everyone expects that billion dollars not to be 
adequate,’ said Edwin Park of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities[.]”). In other 
words, (1) the ACA became law with zero funding for federal exchanges, (2) Congress 
only later added a general implementation fund that could be used for federal ex-
changes, but (3) that fund was insufficient to fund responsibilities HHS was expected 
to undertake, much less federal exchanges.
21  PPACA § 1401(c)(2)(A)(i); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i). 
22  PPACA § 1321(c); 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c).
23  PPACA § 1421(b)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 45R(a)(1).
24  See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i) (direct language); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B), 
(b)(3)(B)(i), (b)(3)(C), (b)(3)(D), (b)(3)(E), (c)(2)(A)(ii), (e)(A) (cross-references).
25  Congressional Research Service, Legal Analysis of Availability of Premium Tax 
Credits in State and Federally Created Exchanges Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, 
Congressional Distribution Memorandum (Jul. 23, 2012) (“[A] strictly textual analysis 
of the plain meaning of the provision would likely lead to the conclusion that the IRS’s 
authority to issue the premium tax credits is limited only to situations in which the 
taxpayer is enrolled in a state-established exchange.”).
56471_CH03_Adler-Cannon_R3.indd   41 9/3/15   12:44 PM
Cato Supreme Court Review
42
The broader context of the ACA supports the plain meaning of 
Section 36B. As noted above, Section 1311 creates a parallel finan-
cial incentive for states to establish exchanges.26 The act explicitly 
defines the District of Columbia as a “State,” bringing a D.C.-estab-
lished exchange within the meaning of “an Exchange established by 
the State.”27 It explicitly treats any U.S. territory that establishes a 
compliant exchange as a “State.”28 The House and HELP bills con-
tained language explicitly creating full equivalence between ex-
changes established by states and those established by HHS.29 Yet 
Congress rejected those bills in favor of the ACA, which includes 
no language defining federal exchanges as having been “established 
by the State,” or otherwise making federal exchanges equivalent to 
state-established exchanges for purposes of Section 36B. 
Remarkably, there is no discussion of the status of tax credits in 
federal exchanges in the Congressional Record, contemporaneous 
media reports, or known communications among the ACA’s draft-
ers and supporters. The only exception of which we are aware sup-
ports the plain meaning of Section 36B. In January 2010, all 11 House 
Democrats from Texas complained that, as in other federal programs 
that condition benefits on state cooperation, residents of states that 
fail to establish exchanges would not receive “any benefit” from the 
ACA, and “will be left no better off than before Congress acted.”30 
There are several reasons for the lack of publicly available contem-
poraneous discussion of this issue.31 Due to the ACA’s peculiar his-
26  42 U.S.C. § 18031(a).
27  42 U.S.C. § 18024(d).
28  42 U.S.C. § 18043(a)(1).
29  See Adler & Cannon, supra note 7, at 158–59.
30  See supra note 11. 
31  Contemporaneous emails, notes, memoranda, and other documents generated by 
the ACA’s drafters, legislative counsel, and House negotiators in 2009 and 2010 pre-
sumably would include at least some discussion of this issue. Unfortunately, congres-
sional Democrats have not made those records available, and the individuals responsi-
ble for drafting 36B have not discussed the issue publicly. See Robert Pear, Four Words 
That Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers Now Say, N.Y. Times, May 
25, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested-
words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html (“The words were 
written by professional drafters—skilled nonpartisan lawyers—from the office of the 
Senate legislative counsel, then James W. Fransen . . . The language of the Finance 
Committee bill was written largely by Mr. Fransen and a tax expert, Mark J. Mathiesen 
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tory, there was never a conference report. “Congress wrote key parts 
of the Act behind closed doors,” the King majority wrote, “rather 
than through the traditional legislative process.”32 The public debate 
was dominated by hot-button issues like a “public option” and abor-
tion funding.33 A general consensus that all states would establish 
exchanges made this restriction uninteresting. The fact that nobody 
expected the ACA to become the final law made it unimportant. 
Nevertheless, the limited legislative history that exists suggests 
this feature was deliberate. The “established by the State” require-
ment originated in the first draft of the Senate Finance Committee’s 
bill, appearing once explicitly and five more times by cross-refer-
ence. It survived multiple revisions throughout the drafting process, 
including revisions to the adjacent cross-reference.34 There is no evi-
dence whatsoever that Senate Democrats even considered altering 
the meaning of that requirement. Instead, under the supervision of 
Senate leaders and White House officials, drafters inserted additional 
mentions of this requirement—a second explicit mention and two 
more cross-references to it—shortly before the ACA went to the Sen-
ate floor.35 
. . . Mr. Fransen did not respond to a message seeking comment, and other attempts 
to reach him were not successful.” Note that this passage contradicts the article’s title; 
Section 36B’s writers did not comment.). 
32  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33  See Gross, supra note 11 (noting that exchanges were “not a hot-button issue like 
abortion or the public option.”). 
34  Compare, e.g., S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009), § 1205, proposing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)
(2)(A)(i) (“and which were enrolled in through an exchange established by the State 
under subpart B of title XXII of the Social Security Act” (emphasis added)), with PPACA 
§ 1401, creating 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (“and which were enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under [section] 1311 of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act” (emphasis added)).
35  Compare America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009), § 
1205, proposing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (limiting credits to those “covered by a 
qualified health benefits plan described in subsection (b)(2)(A)(i),” a cross-reference to 
plans “enrolled in through an exchange established by the State” (emphasis added)), 
with PPACA § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (“covered by a qualified health plan de-
scribed in subsection (b)(2)(A) that was enrolled in through an Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311” (emphasis added)). See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Robert 
Pear, White House Team Joins Talks on Health Care Bill, N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/health/policy/15health.html; Perry Bacon 
Jr., Small Group Now Leads Closed Negotiations on Health-Care Bill, Wash. Post (Oct. 
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Other legislation proposed by the ACA’s authors contained simi-
lar provisions. The HELP bill—as the government and its amici 
conceded—created the same three-legged stool yet conditioned ex-
change subsidies on states implementing that bill’s employer man-
date.36 Those who drafted and supported this bill were willing to cut 
off exchange subsidies in intransigent states.
As this history indicates, ACA supporters actively considered 
conditioning tax credits on state cooperation, and were willing to 
tolerate the instability that would result from imposing community-
rating price controls without offering premium subsidies, in order to 
serve their purpose of getting states to implement the new federal 
program.
III. The Road to King
Government officials and independent analysts were aware of 
Section 36B’s limitations on tax-credit eligibility when constitutional 
challenges to the act were still before lower courts. In late 2010, em-
ployee-benefits attorney Thomas Christina made a presentation at 
the American Enterprise Institute highlighting the fact that the ACA 
authorizes tax credits for those who enroll “through an Exchange es-
tablished by the State under section 1311,” but not for those who en-
roll through federal exchanges.37 One of us heard Christina’s presen-
tation in early 2011 while researching federal-state relations under 
the ACA versus other approaches to “cooperative federalism.” The 
resulting paper, discussing the limitation on tax credits in Section 
18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/17/
AR2009101701810.html. 
36  Brief for the Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) 
(“[T]he Senate HELP Committee bill made tax credits conditional on state action in 
certain respects.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress & State Legislatures, 
Halbig v. Sebelius, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-5018), (“[I]f a state chose not 
to adopt specified insurance reform provisions and make state and local government 
employers subject to specified provisions of the statute, ‘the residents of such State 
shall not be eligible for credits.’”); Timothy Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges in Health 
Care Reform Legal and Policy Issues, Washington & Lee Public Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series (Oct. 23, 2009) (describing the HELP bill: “A state’s residents will only 
become eligible for federal premium subsidies…if the state provides health insurance 
for its state and local government employees.”).
37  Thomas Christina, What to Look for Beyond the Individual Mandate (And How 
to Look for It), Am. Enter. Inst. (Dec. 6, 2010).
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1401 among other aspects of the ACA, was presented at a health law 
conference that spring.38 None of the numerous health law experts 
and government officials in attendance, including the Kansas Insur-
ance Commissioner,39 raised any objection to the plain-meaning in-
terpretation of Section 36B.
According to a later congressional investigation, a Treasury offi-
cial overseeing ACA implementation became aware of this feature 
of the act in March 2011 via media coverage of Christina’s presen-
tation.40 This discovery concerned IRS officials. Soon thereafter, the 
IRS dropped the statutory requirement that tax-credit recipients 
must enroll “through an Exchange established by the State” from 
their draft regulations.41 
The IRS’s decision to focus more closely on this question was no 
doubt motivated by growing resistance to ACA implementation in 
dozens of states.42 A wave election in 2010 swept into office many 
state governors and legislators opposed to implementing the law.43 If 
states could block tax credits by refusing to establish exchanges, they 
could expose the full cost of exchange coverage to enrollees, which 
could affect the act’s popularity and viability. Despite the potential 
38  See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering or Crowding Out? Federal 
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 Kans. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 199 
(2011).
39  See Sandy Praeger, A View from the Insurance Commissioner on Health Care Re-
form, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 186 (2011).
40  See Staff of H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong., Administra-
tion Conducted Inadequate Review of Key Issues Prior to Expanding Health Law’s 
Taxes and Subsidies (Comm. Print 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/IRS-Rule-OGR-WM-Staff-Report-Final1.pdf [hereinafter Oversight 
Report]; Thomas D. Edmondson, Opponents of New Federal Health Care Law Wage 
Constitutional War in Courts, Daily Tax Report, Bloomberg BNA (Jan. 4, 2011), http://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/bna-dtr-article.pdf.
41  See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 17. 
42  See David K. Jones, Katharine W. V. Bradley and Jonathan Oberlander, Pascal’s 
Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma, 39 J. 
Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 97 , 130 (2014) (“The pervasive resistance to Obamacare was 
so strong that many states decided to cede control of the exchanges to the federal 
government.”).
43  See id.; see also Brendan Nyhan, The Effects of Health Care Reform in 2010 and 
Beyond, Brendan-Nyhan.com (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/
blog/2012/03/the-effects-of-health-care-reform-in-2010-and-beyond.html (“Demo-
cratic incumbents who voted yes [on the PPACA] performed significantly worse than 
those who did not.”).
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for unlimited start-up funds and other entreaties by HHS, 34 states 
ultimately refused to establish exchanges. 
After consultations with HHS, on August 17, 2011, the IRS pro-
posed a regulation providing “a taxpayer is eligible for the credit . . . 
through an Exchange established under section 1311 or 1321 of the 
Affordable Care Act”—that is, without regard for whether the ex-
change was established by a state or the federal government.44 
Though IRS officials had discussed whether this approach was per-
missible under Section 36B, the Federal Register notice included no 
mention of the contrary statutory language, much less any basis for 
the IRS’s departure from it.45 Nevertheless, many noticed and raised 
objections to the proposed rule.46 
The IRS did not heed these concerns. On May 23, 2012, it promul-
gated a final regulation purporting to authorize tax credits in ex-
changes established by HHS under Section 1321.47 The rule circum-
vented the statutory text by (1) declaring eligible taxpayers could 
obtain a tax credit if a qualifying insurance plan was purchased on 
“an Exchange”48 and then (2) adopting a definition of “Exchange” 
that HHS had promulgated (in coordination with the IRS) that 
44  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS, Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, Fed. Reg. 
76 (Aug. 17, 2011) (proposed rule), at 50934 (emphasis added). 
45  See Oversight Report, supra note 40; Lisa Rein, Six Words Might Decide the Fate of 
Obamacare at the Supreme Court, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/why-six-words-might-hold-the-fate-of-obamacare-before-the-
supreme-court/2015/03/01/437c2836-bd39-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html. 
46  See, e.g., David Hogberg, Oops! No Obamacare Tax Credit Via Federal Exchang-
es?, Inv. Bus. Daily, Sept. 7, 2011, http://news.investors.com/090711-584085-oops-
no-obamacare-tax-credit-via-federal-exchanges-.htm; Jonathan H. Adler & Michael 
F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare Glitch, Wall Street J., Nov. 16, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577006322431330662.
html; see also Rep. David Phil Roe, U.S. House of Reps., Letter to Douglas Shulman, 
Comm’r, IRS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_IRS_
Commissioner_regarding_tax_credits_under_PPACA_-_11.03.11.pdf, Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch, U.S. Senate, Letter to Timothy Geithner, Treasury Sec’y, and Douglas Shulman, 
Comm’r, IRS (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/documents/ 
12.1.11_premium_credit_letter_to_geithner_and_shulman.pdf. 
47  77 Fed. Reg. 30378 (2012).
48  26 CFR § 1.36B–2 (2013).
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purported to create full equivalence between state-established and 
federal exchanges.49 
The IRS acknowledged opposition to its interpretation, yet offered 
no more than a single conclusory paragraph in response, lacking 
any reference to relevant statutory text or other legal authority for 
its action:
The statutory language of section 36B and other provisions 
of the Affordable Care Act support the interpretation that 
credits are available to taxpayers who obtain coverage 
through a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary 
Exchange, and the Federally-facilitated Exchange. Moreover, 
the relevant legislative history does not demonstrate that 
Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State 
Exchanges. Accordingly, the final regulations maintain the 
rule in the proposed regulations because it is consistent with 
the language, purpose, and structure of section 36B and the 
Affordable Care Act as a whole.50
The IRS purported to rely on the “relevant legislative history,” yet 
cited no legislative history to support the rule, perhaps because no 
such legislative history exists. This bears emphasis: to this day, neither 
the government, nor the Supreme Court, nor anyone else has identi-
fied even a single contemporaneous statement of any kind asserting 
that the ACA authorizes, or that its supporters intended for it to au-
thorize, tax credits in federal exchanges. 
The IRS rule created two types of legally cognizable injuries. First, 
the ACA’s employer mandate penalizes large employers if one or 
more employees are eligible for or receive a tax credit under Section 
36B.51 By offering tax credits in non-establishing states, the IRS rule 
injures employers in those states by exposing them to penalties. Sec-
ond, the individual mandate penalizes taxpayers who do not obtain 
coverage, but only if coverage is “affordable.”52 By offering tax cred-
its in non-establishing states, the IRS rule makes coverage “afford-
49  45 CFR § 155.20 (2013) (defining “Exchange” as “an Exchange serving the indi-
vidual market . . . regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by 
a State . . . or by HHS.”).
50  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS, Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 
30, 377 (May 23, 2012) (final rule). 
51  26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
52  26 U.S.C. § 5001A(e)(1).
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able” for millions of taxpayers, and thus exposes them to penalties 
from which they would otherwise be exempt.
Injured parties soon began challenging the IRS rule in federal 
court. In September 2012, the state of Oklahoma became the first 
plaintiff, claiming injury as an employer (Oklahoma v. Burwell). In 
May 2013, a group of employers and individuals from multiple states 
filed a second challenge (Halbig v. Burwell). In September 2013, four 
Virginia residents challenged the rule (King v. Burwell). In October 
2013, the state of Indiana and dozens of Indiana school districts filed 
a fourth challenge (Indiana v. IRS). 
At district court, the government prevailed in Halbig and King, 
while the challengers prevailed in Oklahoma.53 On July 22, 2014, pan-
els of the D.C. Circuit (Halbig) and the Fourth Circuit (King) issued 
conflicting rulings for and against the challengers, respectively, 
within hours of each other. In Halbig, the full D.C. Circuit granted 
the government’s request for en banc review. The King plaintiffs ap-
pealed their loss to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in 
November 2014. 
IV. The Court’s King Ruling
The Supreme Court sided with the federal government, though not 
on the grounds urged by the solicitor general or most commentators. 
The chief justice’s opinion for the Court was joined by Justice An-
thony Kennedy and the Court’s four “liberal” justices—Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—none 
of whom concurred separately. The Court’s arch-textualist, Justice 
Antonin Scalia, authored a sharp, and at times caustic and sarcastic, 
dissent, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.
Chief Justice Roberts explained that while Section 36B may appear 
clear, it was actually “ambiguous” when viewed in a broader con-
text.54 In the ordinary case, a finding of ambiguity would trigger 
deference to the implementing agency under the Chevron doctrine.55 
53  Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
415 (E.D. Va. 2014); Oklahoma v. Burwell, No. 6:11-cv-00030 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).
54  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490–91.
55  See Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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King was not an ordinary case, however.56 Rather than defer to the 
IRS’s interpretation, the Court resolved the ambiguity itself. Turning 
again to the broader statutory context, and the potential effects of 
enforcing Section 36B as written, the Court concluded that the ACA 
should be read to authorize tax credits in federal exchanges. Though 
the text of Section 36B authorizes tax credits for insurance purchased 
on exchanges “established by the State under section 1311,” this lan-
guage will henceforth be read to authorize tax credits for insurance 
purchased on exchanges established by states under Section 1311 or 
by the federal government under Section 1321. 
Roberts’s primary rationale was that a “fair construction” of the 
statute requires more than giving meaning to discrete phrases—
and cannot be constrained by the semantic meaning of ordinary 
terms, or even statutorily defined terms, such as “State.” The chief 
justice wrote that it is the Court’s job to avoid, “if at all possible,” 
an interpretation that would undermine the ACA’s goal of improv-
ing health insurance markets—such as an interpretation that, when 
combined with the intervening decisions of dozens of states not to 
establish exchanges, could create a “death spiral” of increasing costs 
and declining coverage.57 Therefore the statutory language was to be 
stretched so as to conform to “what we see as Congress’s plan.”58 If 
that required ignoring some portions of the text, or subverting an-
other purpose of the statute, so be it. The chief justice decided where 
the Court should go and was determined not to let the text get in the 
way.59 But to make it work, the Court’s majority would have to find 
56  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (“In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason 
to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” 
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000))).
57  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
58  Id.
59  As commentators have noted, the chief justice has been similarly aggressive and 
creative in his interpretation of other statutes. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. 
No. One v. Holder (“NAMUDNO”), 557 U.S. 193 (2009), Richard L. Hasen, Constitu-
tional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup Ct. Rev. 181, 182 
(2009) ( “[I]n NAMUDNO, the Court applied the [constitutional avoidance] canon to 
adopt an implausible reading of a statute that appeared contrary to textual analysis, 
congressional intent, and administrative action.”); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
2077 (2014); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond v. United States: Concurring in the 
Judgment, 2013–2014 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 285, 287 (2014) (“[Roberts’ opinion is] an ob-
ject lesson in dodgy statutory interpretation.”).
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a way to dispense with “the most natural reading” of the relevant 
statutory provisions.60
Before looking at what the majority did, it is worth noting which 
arguments the Court did not adopt. It did not accept the primary ar-
guments offered by the solicitor general. It did not accept that “estab-
lished by the State” was a “statutory term of art,”61 nor did it claim 
the text clearly compelled its result, as the government also urged. 
Indeed, not a single justice adopted those arguments. To the contrary, 
the Court claimed the relevant text was ambiguous. While some crit-
ics maintained the plaintiffs’ arguments were frivolous or absurd, 
not a single justice expressed this view in an opinion.62 According 
to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court, the plaintiffs’ “argu-
ments about the plain meaning of Section 36B are strong.”63
Though the Court claimed to be following “Congress’s plan,” it 
did not rely much on traditional sources of legislative history to de-
termine Congress’s unstated purpose, and was quite selective in the 
sources of legislative history it did cite. Nor did the Court take the 
suggestion offered by some commentators that it should rely upon 
the scoring of the ACA by the Congressional Budget Office64 or ex 
60  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
61  See Brief for the Respondents at 20–25, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 
14-114).
62  Many commentators were quite dismissive of arguments against the IRS rule. One 
prominent critic called them “screwy,” “nutty,” and “stupid” (Erika Eichelberger, Con-
servatives Insist Obamacare Is on Its Deathbed, Mother Jones (Jan. 24, 2013), http://
www.motherjones.com/print/214256). Others charged that the litigation was “frivo-
lous” (Harold Pollack, If the Latest Obamacare Lawsuit Succeeds, Obamacare Is in Big 
Trouble, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonk-
blog/wp/2014/02/03/if-the-latest-obamacare-lawsuit-succeeds-obamacare-is-in-
big-trouble/); that it was “a conspicuously weak case that should never have reached 
the Supreme Court”; that it was “obvious” the ACA authorizes those provisions in 
federal exchanges; or that King was nothing but a “trolling exercise” (Harold Pollack, 
The Greatest Trolling Exercise in the History of Health Policy Is Over, Politico (blog) 
(June 25, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/health-care-
supreme-court-king-burwell-119446.html). Not all commentators took this position, 
however. See Sarah Kliff, The Accidental Case Against Obamacare, Vox.com (May 26, 
2015) (“‘When I read prominent people saying this case was frivolous, I winced a bit,’ 
says Nicholas Bagley, an assistant law professor at the University of Michigan who has 
written extensively on the King challenge. ‘This is a serious lawsuit.’”).
63  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495. 
64  See, e.g., Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate over Tax Credits on Fed-
erally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, Balkinization (July 10, 2012), http://
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post comments offered by legislators and staff to explain the inconve-
nient wording of the relevant provisions.65 Though the Court admit-
ted the ACA was the result of “inartful drafting,”66 it did not claim 
the relevant language was a scrivener’s error.
Some thought the Court might rely upon federalism principles 
to side with the government, out of a concern that conditioning tax 
credits on state cooperation would be unduly coercive.67 Several 
amici raised federalism concerns of various stripes,68 and Justice 
Kennedy seemed amenable to such an approach at oral argument.69 
balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html; Dylan 
Scott, BOOM: The Historic Proof Obamacare Foes Are Dead Wrong on Subsidies, 
Talking Points Memo (Aug. 1, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/obam-
acare-halbig-cbo-scores. For an explanation of why the CBO score did not actually 
establish the correctness of the government’s position see David Ziff, TPM’s Halbig/
PPACA “BOOM” Goes Boom, Ziff Blog (Aug. 1, 2014), https://ziffblog.wordpress.
com/2014/08/01/tpms-halbigppaca-boom-goes-boom.
65  See, e.g., Robert Pear, Four Words, supra note 31 (“The answer, from interviews 
with more than two dozen Democrats and Republicans involved in writing the law, 
is that the words were a product of shifting politics and a sloppy merging of different 
versions. Some described the words as ‘inadvertent,’ ‘inartful’ or ‘a drafting error.’ 
But none supported the contention of the plaintiffs, who are from Virginia.”); but see 
text accompanying note 31, supra. Doug Kendall, Carvin’s Cornhusker Quandry in 
King, Huffington Post (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-kend-
all/carvins-cornhusker-quanda_b_6581690.html (quoting Senator Nelson as saying, 
“I always believed that tax credits should be available in all 50 states regardless of 
who built the exchange, and the final law also reflects that belief as well.” (emphasis 
in original)); but see Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell: In 2013, Nelson Admitted 
He Didn’t Know If ACA Offered Subsidies in Fed. Exchanges, Forbes.com (Feb. 10, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcannon/2015/02/10/king-v-burwell-
in-2013-nelson-admitted-he-didnt-know-if-aca-offered-subsidies-in-fed-exchanges/ 
(“In other words, if we want to know what Nelson actually intended to become law, 
asking Ben Nelson is not an option. Our only option is to read the bill.”).
66  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
67  See, e.g., David G. Savage, Obamacare Defense Is Tailored for Key Supreme Court 
Justices, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/
healthcare/la-na-court-health-argument-20150226-story.html.
68  See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief for Professor 
Thomas W. Merrill, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & 
Social Action (JALSA), et al., in Support of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480 (2015) (No 14-114).
69  Transcript of Oral argument at 16, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 
14-114) (“JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me say that from the standpoint of the dynam-
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Yet there was no mention of federalism in the Court’s opinion. If 
such concerns did influence the justices, they did not see the need to 
mention them. 
Perhaps tellingly, the Court openly adopted a non-textualist ap-
proach to interpreting the ACA. As Professor Abbe Gluck observed, 
“King is one of the only major text-oriented statutory interpretation 
decisions in recent memory in which the majority opinion barely in-
cludes a single canon of interpretation.”70 Moreover, the chief justice’s 
opinion expressly rejects some interpretive canons that textualists 
hold dear. As Gluck noted, “This is not Antonin Scalia’s textualism”71 
—a point Justice Scalia’s dissent made clear. Instead, the Court ad-
opted a “fair construction” of the statute over the plain meaning of 
relevant provisions and congressionally provided definitions.72 
The problem with the Court’s “fair construction” is that it consid-
ered only those parts of the statute that, once isolated, could be used 
to cast doubt on the intentionality of Section 36B, while it dismissed, 
disregarded, or distorted other provisions that completely dispel 
those doubts. If this is a “fair construction,” it is one that elevates 
judicial construction over legislative action.73
V. Desperately Seeking Ambiguity
Chief Justice Roberts went to extraordinary lengths to find the act 
ambiguous. He conceded “the most natural reading of the pertinent 
statutory phrase”74 is that tax credits are available “only” through 
ics of Federalism, it does seem to me that there is something very powerful to the point 
that if your argument is accepted, the States are being told either create your own 
Exchange, or we’ll send your insurance market into a death spiral.”).
70  Abbe Gluck, Congress Has a “Plan” and the Court Can Understand It—The 
Court rises to the challenge of statutory complexity in King v. Burwell, SCOTUSBlog 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-congress-has-
a-plan-and-the-court-can-understand-it-the-court-rises-to-the-challenge-of-statutory-
complexity-in-king-v-burwell.
71  Id.
72  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
73  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 57 (2012) (noting that for a court to find legislative purpose “in the absence of 
a clear indication in the text is to provide the judge’s answer rather than the text’s 
answer to the question”).
74  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
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“an Exchange established by the State under [Section 1311].”75 He im-
plicitly conceded the ACA is otherwise silent on the question pre-
sented: the Court failed to identify even a single piece of statutory 
text or scrap of legislative history in which any member of Congress 
claimed the ACA would offer tax credits in federal exchanges. That 
should have resolved the matter.76 Nevertheless, Roberts still man-
aged to find the operative text ambiguous “when read in context.”77
There was no disagreement among the justices that statutory struc-
ture, design, and context are useful in resolving latent ambiguities in 
statutory provisions.78 As Justice Scalia counseled in dissent, “Statu-
tory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify 
an otherwise ambiguous provision.”79 Yet the majority not only used 
statutory context to resolve ambiguity, but to create the ambiguity in 
the first place. Worse, the majority considered text selectively and 
adopted inconsistent presumptions about the applicability of statu-
tory provisions bearing on the question. Though Roberts conceded 
that “established by the State” is clear on its face and the only statu-
tory text that speaks directly to the question presented, by the time 
he was done, he rendered that provision not only ambiguous but 
meaningless. It was as if the majority was determined to shoehorn 
inconvenient statutory text into a preconceived narrative of how the 
statute should operate. After all, as Roberts explained, the statute 
must be read this way “if at all possible.” 
The Court’s judgment ultimately rested on a conclusion that the 
relevant text was “ambiguous”—or could at least be read as such 
in context. But what was ambiguous? Not the word “State,” given 
that Congress took pains to define this term to exclude federal 
75  Id. at 2489.
76  See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (noting that contextual interpretation 
must yield to an “insuperable textual barrier”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253–54 (1992) (“[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, 
cardinal canon before all others . . . courts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last.” (citations omitted)).
77  Id. at 2490. 
78  See id. at 2492 (noting the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the 
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U. S. 120, 133 (2000))); id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2502. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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exchanges.80 Perhaps “establish” is ambiguous, but not in a way that 
muddies whether it is the state or HHS that is doing the establishing. 
Consider in more detail the analysis underlying the majority’s 
conclusion that the statute is “properly viewed as ambiguous” on the 
question of whether it authorizes tax credits in federal exchanges.81 
As the Court accepted, “the most natural reading of the pertinent 
statutory phrase”82 is that the ACA authorizes tax credits “only” 
through “an Exchange established by the State under [Section 1311].”83 
Under this language, for tax credits to issue, “three things must be 
true: First, the individual must enroll in an insurance plan through ‘an 
Exchange.’ Second, that Exchange must be ‘established by the State.’ 
And third, that Exchange must be established ‘under [Section 1311].”84 
The first requirement, that tax credits are only available for the 
purchase of insurance through “an Exchange,” is uncontroversial, as 
is the proposition that both state and federal exchanges satisfy this 
initial requirement, even though limiting tax credits to exchange-
based insurance purchases limits their availability and potentially 
undermines the legislative purpose of subsidizing insurance.85 Sec-
tion 1321 requires the HHS secretary to “establish” an exchange in 
any state that fails to do so (or otherwise fails to comply with relevant 
ACA requirements) and indicates that this exchange should be the 
practical equivalent of the exchange for which it substitutes. Federal 
and state exchanges may be “established by different sovereigns,”86 
the Court wrote, but both enable consumers to engage in compari-
son shopping and facilitate government regulation of health insur-
ance offerings.87
80  See 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d).
81  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
82  Id. at 2495.
83  Id. at 2489. 
84  Id.
85  Actually, the government has ignored this tax-credit eligibility requirement as 
well. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Health Law Fix for State-Run Websites, Assoc. Press, 
Feb. 28, 2014 (“HHS said state residents who were unable to sign up because of techni-
cal problems may still get federal tax credits if they bought private insurance outside 
of the new online insurance exchanges.”).
86  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
87  See Max Baucus, Reforming America’s Health Care System: A Call to Action, S. 
Fin. Comm., Nov. 12, 2008, at 17 (“The Exchange would be an independent entity, the 
primary purpose of which would be to organize affordable health insurance options, 
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Next the Court turned to the phrase “established by the State.” 
This language would seem to be clear and unambiguous. Any mem-
ber of Congress who had bothered to read the relevant provisions 
would have understood what it meant.88 As Chief Justice Roberts 
conceded, “it might seem that a Federal Exchange cannot fulfill this 
requirement.”89 Lest there be any doubt, as the majority conceded, 
the ACA defines “State” in a manner “that does not include the Fed-
eral Government.”90
Despite the plain meaning of “established by the State,” despite 
the statutory definition of “State,” despite the consistent (and con-
ventional) usage of the word “establish” throughout the statute, and 
despite the majority’s acknowledgement that the plaintiffs offered 
“the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase,” the ma-
jority asserted that “when read in context, ‘with a view to [its] place 
in the overall statutory scheme,’ the meaning of that phrase ‘estab-
lished by the State’ is not so clear.”91 Other provisions of the statute, 
the majority wrote, “suggest that the Act may not always use the 
phrase ‘established by the State’ in its most natural sense.”92
The Court cites just one statutory provision, found in Section 
1312, to substantiate its claim that other provisions of the ACA “sug-
gest” that “established by the State” “may not” mean what it says. 
Yet not only does that provision not contradict or other undermine 
create understandable, comparable information about those options, and develop a 
standard application for enrollment in a chosen plan” (emphasis added)); Praeger, 
supra note 39, at 190 (“The main purpose of the exchanges will be to facilitate the 
comparison and purchase of coverage by individuals and small businesses.”); see also 
Michael F. Cannon, ObamaCare’s Exchanges Perform More than a Dozen Functions 
Besides Issuing Subsidies (Updated), Cato@Liberty, (June 27, 2014), http://www.
cato.org/blog/obamacares-exchanges-perform-more-dozen-other-functions-besides-
issuing-subsidies.
88  Note, however, that not all may have read the statute. For example, Senator Max 
Baucus, one of the ACA’s chief architects, remarked that it would be a “waste [of his] 
time to read every page of the bill,” since it’s “statutory language,” and that’s what 
“experts” are for. Jordan Fabian, Key Senate Democrat Suggests that He Didn’t Read 
Entire Healthcare Reform Bill, The Hill (Aug. 25, 2010), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
blog-briefing-room/news/115749-sen-baucus-suggests-he-did-not-read-entire-
health-bill.
89  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–90.
90  Id. at 2490.
91  Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
92  Id.
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a straightforward interpretation of “established by the State,” it does 
not even utilize that phrase.
Section 1312 defines “qualified individuals,” in relevant part, as 
those who “reside[] in the State that established the Exchange.”93 
The majority thinks this casts doubt on the plain meaning of “estab-
lished by the State.” Why? If the Court were to interpret such lan-
guage as drawing distinctions between state-established and federal 
exchanges, the majority reasoned, then “there would be no ‘quali-
fied individuals’ on Federal Exchanges.”94 Federal exchanges would 
therefore not be able to meet several requirements the act imposes 
with respect to qualified individuals. For example, explains Chief 
Justice Roberts, “the Act requires all Exchanges to ‘make available 
qualified health plans to qualified individuals’—something an Ex-
change could not do if there were no such individuals.”95
The majority’s argument fails on three levels. First, as Justice Sca-
lia notes in dissent, it would be perfectly reasonable for Congress 
to create a category of enrollees that is unique to state-established 
exchanges:
Imagine that a university sends around a bulletin reminding 
every professor to take the “interests of graduate students” into 
account when setting office hours, but that some professors 
teach only undergraduates. Would anybody reason that 
the bulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor has 
“graduate students,” so that “graduate students” must really 
mean “graduate or undergraduate students”? Surely not. Just 
as one naturally reads instructions about graduate students 
to be inapplicable to the extent a particular professor has no 
such students, so too would one naturally read instructions 
about qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a 
particular Exchange has no such individuals.96
The majority responds that Congress would have had no reason 
to detail requirements related to “qualified individuals” if there 
were to be no qualified individuals in federal exchanges. Yet such 
reasons abound, both in the ACA and its legislative history. Sections 
93  42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A).
94  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490.
95  Id.
96  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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1311, 1321, and other provisions make clear that many Senate Demo-
crats feared that states might not implement the ACA as well or as 
faithfully as the secretary would. The ACA therefore provides wide 
discretion to the secretary, while states get detailed instructions.97 
There is thus nothing about the “qualified individuals” definition 
that casts doubt on the meaning of “established by the State.” Any 
anomalies the majority identifies flow not from the text, but from the 
majority’s atextual assumptions about Congress’s plan.
Second, context further shows that the “qualified individuals” 
definition casts no doubt on what Congress meant by “established 
by the State,” and instead supports the plain meaning of that phrase. 
There is a reason why Section 1312 defines “qualified individuals” in 
terms of “the State that established the Exchange.” In Sections 1311, 
1312, and 1313, Congress is speaking to states. Those sections direct 
states to establish exchanges and detail related requirements. Sec-
tion 1312 defines “qualified individuals” in terms of “the State that 
established the Exchange” because the whole point of these sections 
is that Congress is presuming that states will establish exchanges. 
Context also shows the “qualified individuals” definition still has 
applicability to federal exchanges, despite the fact that they are not 
established by states. In the very next section, Section 1321, Congress 
drops the presumption that each state will establish an exchange, 
and explains what the secretary “shall” do if states fail to establish ex-
changes. Section 1321 directs the secretary to “issue regulations set-
ting standards for meeting the requirements under this title,” which 
encompasses regulations for both state-established and federal ex-
changes, and to implement “such . . . requirements” if a state fails to 
do so. That is, if Sections 1311, 1312, or 1313 impose requirements on 
state-established exchanges that would be inappropriate in the case 
of a federal exchange, Section 1321 authorizes the secretary to issue 
and enforce a parallel requirement. In this case, it authorizes the 
HHS secretary to develop a “qualified individuals” definition appro-
priate to federal exchanges—that is, that qualified individuals must 
reside in the state “within” which “the Secretary . . . establish[es]” 
an Exchange.98 The only ambiguity that exists is whether the ACA 
requires the secretary to develop a “qualified individuals” definition 
97  See PPACA § 1321; 42 U.S.C. § 18041.
98  See id. at (a), (c).
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for federal exchanges or (per Justice Scalia) merely authorizes her to 
do so. In neither case does Section 1321’s “qualified individuals” def-
inition cast doubt on the meaning of “established by the State.”
Thus it is not true that giving the phrase “established by the State” 
its plain meaning would mean there would be no qualified individu-
als in federal exchanges. Context shows that Congress covered that 
contingency. Unfortunately, the Court only looked to part of the 
context—the part that supported its preconceived understanding of 
“Congress’s plan.” 
Third, even if one were to conclude that the provisions relating to 
“qualified individuals” created an anomaly, this does not “suggest,” 
let alone demonstrate, that other language used in other parts of the 
statute is ambiguous. The majority’s reliance on the “qualified indi-
vidual” provision on this point is even more curious given the ma-
jority’s refusal to consider the operation of the phrase “established 
by the State” in other parts of the ACA. “Because the other provi-
sions cited by the dissent are not at issue here,” the majority meekly 
explains in a footnote, “we do not address them.”99 The majority 
did not even address the reference to exchanges “established by the 
State” in Section 1311, despite that section’s obvious relevance to the 
question at hand.100 So much for considering the statute as a whole.
When the majority turns to consider whether an exchange estab-
lished by the federal government as required under Section 1321 
could qualify as an exchange established “under Section 1311,” it 
takes further liberties with the statutory text. Here, the majority 
claims that the statutory definition of an “Exchange” forces the con-
clusion that Section 1321 “authorizes the Secretary to establish an Ex-
change under Section [1311], not (or not only) under Section [1321].”101 
The relevant text does nothing of the kind.
The linchpin of the majority’s argument here is the statutory defi-
nition of “Exchange” provided for in ACA Section 1563: “The term 
‘Exchange’ means an American Health Benefit Exchange established 
under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
99  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493 n.3.
100  42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3) (“AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—A 
State may elect to authorize an Exchange established by the State under this section to 
enter into an agreement with an eligible entity to carry out 1 or more responsibilities of 
the Exchange.” (emphasis added)). See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
101  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490–91.
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Act.”102 According to the majority, “every time the Act uses the word 
‘Exchange,’ the definitional provision requires that we substitute the 
phrase ‘Exchange established under section [1311].’”103 The statute 
flatly contradicts this claim. 
Section 1563 adds that definition of “Exchange” to the Public 
Health Service Act to conform that statute to the ACA. Section 1551 
then conforms the ACA to the PHSA by circuitously importing that 
and other PHSA definitions back into the ACA. Contrary to the ma-
jority opinion, however, Section 1551 expressly provides that PHSA 
definitions are not to be applied “every time” the relevant terms 
are mentioned in the ACA. Section 1551 provides that PHSA defi-
nitions “shall apply” to the ACA “unless specifically provided for 
otherwise.”104 With respect to federal exchanges, the ACA specifi-
cally provides that they are established under Section 1321.105 Thus 
the PHSA definition that exchanges are “established under Section 
1311” does not apply. The majority’s claim that the ACA “requires” 
the Court to insert this definition of “Exchange” into Section 1321 
is simply false. The majority erases the distinction between Section 
1311 exchanges and Section 1321 exchanges only by ignoring Con-
gress’s express instructions. After it cavalierly interprets a universal 
definition of “State” to be conditional, the majority then interprets 
a conditional definition of “Exchange” to be universal—all in the 
name of “what we see as Congress’s plan.”
Having sufficiently tampered with two statutory definitions, the 
majority then proceeds to claim that federal exchanges established 
under Section 1321 are also established under Section 1311. “All of 
the requirements that an Exchange must meet are in Section [1311],” 
the majority asserts.106 Therefore, a federal exchange must be “estab-
lished under Section 1311” or else “literally none of the Act’s require-
ments would apply to them.”107 Again, the statute flatly contradicts 
the majority’s claims.
102  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21).
103  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491 (emphasis added).
104  PPACA § 1551.
105  42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1). See also 45 CFR § 155.20 (2013) (“Federally-facilitated Ex-
change means an Exchange established and operated within a State by the Secretary 
under section 1321(c)(1) of the Affordable Care Act.”).
106  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
107  Id.
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It is not true that “all of the requirements” for exchanges are con-
tained in Section 1311. Sections 1312 and 1313 also impose require-
ments on exchanges.108 The reconciliation amendments imposed re-
porting requirements on exchanges codified in Section 36B of the 
Internal Revenue Code—the provisions created by Section 1401—and 
those requirements distinguished between Section 1311 and Section 
1321 exchanges.109 Section 1321 imposes requirements on exchanges 
when it obligates the HHS secretary to “issue regulations setting 
standards” for exchanges to meet “the requirements under this title” 
(that is, not just Section 1311), and further authorizes the secretary to 
impose “such other requirements as the Secretary determines appro-
priate” (that is, beyond what the ACA itself requires).110 
Indeed, far from conflating state-run and federal exchanges, Sec-
tion 1321 draws a bright line between the two. It authorizes the secre-
tary to write rules for both Section 1311 exchanges and Section 1321 
exchanges, which remain distinct. This authority includes the ability 
to write separate rules for federal exchanges in cases where the rules 
for state-established exchanges would make no sense. 
The majority’s selective contextualism creates anomalies that 
exist nowhere under a plain-meaning interpretation of Section 36B 
and the act’s broader context. For example, the ACA prohibits the 
use of federal funds for the operating expenses of Section 1311 ex-
changes.111 Under a plain-meaning interpretation, where Section 
1311 and 1321 exchanges are distinct, this poses no problems. Sec-
tion 1321 authorizes the secretary to draft a parallel rule appropri-
ate to federally administered exchanges (for example, that they may 
use federal funds, but must be self-sufficient). If the majority were 
correct that federal exchanges are Section 1311 exchanges, however, 
it would create the anomaly that federal exchanges must somehow 
operate with no federal funds. Likewise, Section 1311 grants states 
the power to choose whether “an Exchange established by the State” 
may contract out certain exchange functions. If the majority were 
correct that federal exchanges are “established by the State under 
Section 1311,” it would create an anomaly where states that did not 
108  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(4), § 18033(a)(1). 
109  26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3).
110  42 U.S.C. § 18041(a), (c) (emphasis added).
111  42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5).
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establish exchanges could dictate whether a federal agency may con-
tract with outside entities.112 The majority’s selective contextualism 
creates such anomalies by ignoring these and other provisions that 
reveal Congress’s actual plan to be quite different from what the ma-
jority imagines. 
True to form, the majority does devote attention to a part of Sec-
tion 1321 that, once isolated, it uses to cast doubt on the clear line 
Section 36B draws between state-established and federal exchanges. 
To support its conclusion that the phrase “Exchange established by 
the State under Section [1311]” could refer to “all Exchanges—both 
State and Federal—at least for purposes of the tax credits,” it points 
to Section 1321’s instructions to the HHS secretary.113 This provision 
provides that should a state fail to create the “required Exchange,” 
the secretary shall “establish and operate such Exchange within the 
State.”114 
According to the majority, “by using the words ‘such Exchange,’ 
the Act indicates that State and Federal Exchanges should be the 
same.”115 The majority is correct in that this language indicates the 
exchange established by the secretary should perform the same gen-
eral functions as those established by states under Section 1311. Sec-
tion 1321 anticipates this by expressly authorizing the secretary to 
adopt regulations providing that HHS exchanges will operate like 
state exchanges. Yet this is not enough to fulfill the requirements 
of Section 36B, as the relevant language speaks both to the type of 
exchange in which tax credits are to be available, as well as the sov-
ereign that has established it.116 So even if “such Exchange” could be 
read to make a Section 1321 exchange legally equivalent to a Section 
1311 exchange, it is still not an exchange “established by the State.” 
This understanding is confirmed by consideration of other rele-
vant provisions of the statute. Section 1323 provides that when a U.S. 
territory creates “such an Exchange,” the territory “shall be treated 
112  42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3). See supra note 100.
113  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
114  42 U.S.C. § 18041 (c).
115  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
116  See id. at 2489–90 (“State and Federal Exchanges are established by different sov-
ereigns”); see also Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[S]ubsidies 
also turn on a third attribute of Exchanges: who established them.”).
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as a State.”117 The fact that Congress considered it necessary to in-
sert that explicit equivalence language shows that Congress did not 
consider the word “such” to have the meaning the majority claims. 
Similarly, when Congress sought to create full equivalence between 
actions undertaken by the federal and state governments it did so 
explicitly. Section 1322, for instance, conditions recognition of an 
organization as a “qualified nonprofit health insurance issuer,” in 
part, on the state adopting insurance market reforms or “the Secre-
tary ha[ving] implemented [the reforms] for the State.”118 Congress 
knew full well how to authorize the federal government to stand in 
the state’s shoes. It did not do so here. The phrase “such Exchange” 
may indicate that federal exchanges have the same intrinsic char-
acteristics as a state-established exchange, but tax-credit eligibility 
hinges on the extrinsic characteristic of which sovereign established 
the exchange. 
The majority seeks further support for its conclusion that the 
relevant language is ambiguous by pointing to “several provisions 
that assume tax credits will be available on both State and Federal 
Exchanges.”119 Yet the first two provisions the majority cites in sup-
port of this proposition are taken from Section 1311—the very sec-
tion that instructs states to create exchanges in the first place. That 
Section 1311 includes provisions that assume tax credits will be 
available in Section 1311 exchanges is hardly surprising given that 
Section 1401 provides tax credits in exchanges “established by the 
State under Section 1311.” These provisions lend no support for the 
majority’s position. At best, they beg the question.
The majority also points to Section 36B’s requirements that both 
state and federal exchanges report information on health insurance 
purchases, including information about any tax credits provided.”120 
In the majority’s view it “would make little sense” to require reporting 
on tax credits were such credits not available in federal exchanges.121 
Yet even under the majority’s interpretation, these reporting 
requirements apply to instances where tax credits are not available. 
117  42 U.S.C. § 18043(a)(1).
118  42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(6).
119  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
120  26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3).
121  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
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This requirement obligates all exchanges to report information on all 
enrollees, yet not all those who purchase insurance on exchanges are 
eligible for tax credits due to income or other characteristics. Further, 
as the D.C. Circuit noted in Halbig, “even if credits are unavailable 
on federal Exchanges, reporting by those Exchanges still serves the 
purpose of enforcing the individual mandate—a point the IRS, in 
fact, acknowledged.”122
Having walked through “Exchange established by the State under 
Section [1311],” the majority now concludes that this phrase “is prop-
erly viewed as ambiguous.”123 Yet the majority’s tortured path came 
at the expense of plain language and Congress’s express commands. 
That’s not all. In his dissent, Justice Scalia summarized some of the 
other steps the majority took in its quest to find ambiguity:
To mention just the highlights, the Court’s interpretation 
clashes with a statutory definition, renders words inoperative 
in at least seven separate provisions of the Act, overlooks the 
contrast between provisions that say “Exchange” and those 
that say “Exchange established by the State,” gives the same 
phrase one meaning for purposes of tax credits but an entirely 
different meaning for other purposes, and (let us not forget) 
contradicts the ordinary meaning of the words Congress 
used. On the other side of the ledger, the Court has come up 
with nothing more than a general provision that turns out 
to be controlled by a specific one, a handful of clauses that 
are consistent with either understanding of establishment by 
the State, and a resemblance between the tax-credit provision 
and the rest of the Tax Code. If that is all it takes to make 
something ambiguous, everything is ambiguous.124
Indeed.
VI. A Most Plausible Implausibility
Having concluded that the relevant statutory text is “ambiguous,” 
the majority turns “to the broader structure of the Act to determine 
the meaning of Section 36B.”125 Rather than consider the text of 
122  758 F. 3d. at 403.
123  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
124  Id. at 2502–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125  Id. at 2492.
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the ACA, however, the majority focused instead on the “statutory 
scheme”—the aforementioned three-legged stool—and concluded 
that tax credits simply must be available in federal exchanges. Oth-
erwise, the act would threaten to “destabilize” the individual insur-
ance market in any state that failed to establish its own exchange. 
The idea that Congress would allow such a result, the majority rea-
soned, was “implausible.”126 Section 36B’s tax credits “are necessary 
for Federal Exchanges to function like their State Exchange coun-
terparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress 
plainly meant to avoid.”127
The majority hangs its resolution of this purported ambiguity 
upon its assumption that Congress would not have enacted a pro-
vision that threatened to undermine its goal of expanding health 
insurance coverage. More specifically, the majority concluded that 
Congress would not have imposed costly restrictions on health in-
surance providers, such as community-rated premiums, without 
also imposing mandates and providing subsidies to stabilize mar-
kets. However reasonable this assumption may seem in the abstract, 
the ACA’s legislative history flatly contradicts it. The ACA’s leading 
advocates considered, supported, and in some cases enacted provi-
sions that would undermine the very coverage expansions the ma-
jority claims Congress would never undermine. While the major-
ity assumes ACA supporters would not support community rating 
without also providing for subsidies and a mandate to combat the 
resulting instability, they did exactly that, over and over again, in-
cluding where the Court claimed Congress wouldn’t. 
Both the ACA and the House bill created a long-term-care entitle-
ment program called the Community Living Assistance Services 
and Supports (CLASS) Act. Each bill imposed community-rated pre-
miums and an explicit prohibition on subsidies that might reduce 
the resulting instability.128 ACA supporters enacted these provisions 
126  Id. at 2493–94.
127  Id. at 2496.
128  42 U.S.C. § 300ll-7(b) (“No taxpayer funds shall be used for payment of ben-
efits under a CLASS Independent Benefit Plan. For purposes of this subsection, the 
term ‘taxpayer funds’ means any Federal funds from a source other than premium.”). 
Richard S. Foster, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of 
the “America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009” (H.R. 3962), as Passed by the 
House on November 7, 2009 (2009), at 10. 
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despite repeated warnings that “voluntary, unsubsidized, and non-
underwritten insurance programs such as CLASS face a significant 
risk of failure as a result of adverse selection by participants.”129 The 
CLASS Act promptly collapsed, and Congress repealed it.130 Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Roberts, the CLASS Act doesn’t count because 
it is “a comparatively minor program” and not part of “the general 
health insurance program—the very heart of the Act.”131 Again, so 
much for reading the statute as a whole. 
That objection cannot be raised against Congress’s imposition of 
the ACA’s prohibitions on pre-existing-condition exclusions and 
discrimination based on health status with respect to children. In 
the market for child-only health insurance policies, the ACA im-
posed these measures beginning September 23, 2010—more than 
three years before it provided subsidies or imposed a purchase man-
date.132 Those markets either constricted or completely collapsed in 
two-thirds of the states.133 These facts belie the majority’s claims that 
Congress deemed all three legs of the stool “should take effect on 
the same day—January 1, 2014,”134 and that ACA supporters subor-
dinated everything to their desire “to avoid adverse selection in the 
health insurance markets.”135
Moreover, in developing the ACA, Congress indisputably consid-
ered provisions that would condition tax credits and other subsidies 
for the purchase of insurance on state cooperation, and advanced leg-
islation that could force exchanges to operate without the benefit of 
premium subsidies. The HELP bill, for example, withheld premium 
subsidies in any state that refused to implement that bill’s employer 
129  Id.at 11. See also Am. Academy of Actuaries, Critical Issues in Health Reform: 
Community Living Assistance Service and Supports Act (CLASS) (2009). 
130  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 642, 126 Stat. 2313, 
2358 (2013) (repealing the CLASS Act).
131  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494 n.4.
132  Pub. L. 111–148, § 1255  (“the provisions of [42 U.S.C. 300gg–3] (as amended by 
section 1201), as they apply to enrollees who are under 19 years of age, shall become 
effective for plan years beginning on or after the date that is 6 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act”).
133  S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 112th Cong., Ranking Member 
Rep. Enzi: Health Care Reform Law’s Impact on Child-Only Health Insurance Policies 
5 (Aug. 2, 2011).
134  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
135  Id. at 2494 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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mandate. The result, in non-cooperating states, would have been ex-
changes selling health insurance subject to even more destabilizing 
community-rating price controls than the ACA imposes, but with-
out any subsidies to rescue those markets. All 12 HELP Commit-
tee Democrats, a group that included several of the ACA’s authors, 
voted in favor of that bill and that provision. One cannot reasonably 
argue the plain meaning of Section 36B is implausible when even the 
government and its amici concede that the ACA’s authors supported 
another bill that also could have destroyed health insurance markets 
in uncooperative states.136 And yet, to determine what ACA support-
ers were thinking, the Court relied on testimony delivered by a non-
member of Congress to the HELP Committee, and ignored legislation 
produced by the HELP Committee—that is, by a dozen of the ACA’s 
authors and supporters—that dispositively shows ACA supporters 
accepted conditioning exchange subsidies on state cooperation.137 
Similarly, the Finance bill conditioned small-business tax credits 
on states implementing that bill’s community-rating price controls.138 
Senate Democrats dropped these provisions from the Finance and 
HELP bills at the same time they reinforced the Finance provisions 
conditioning tax credits on states establishing exchanges. 
Congress was willing to risk even more destruction with the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion. As the ACA was originally drafted, state re-
fusal to expand Medicaid would result in the loss of health insurance 
subsidies for the most vulnerable segments of society. Even after the 
Court severed the Medicaid expansion from traditional Medicaid in 
NFIB, it remains the case that a state’s refusal to accept the expansion 
exposes the poorest of the working poor to higher health insurance 
136  See supra note 36. 
137  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486. See also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John 
G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 109th Cong., First Session, S. HRG. 109–158, (Sept.12–15, 
2005) (explaining the use of legislative history to resolve textual ambiguities “requires 
a certain sensitivity . . . . All legislative history is not created equal.”). 
138  See S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009), § 1221(a), proposing 26 U.S.C. § 45R(c)(2) (“STATE 
FAILURE TO ADOPT INSURANCE RATING REFORMS. — No credit shall be deter-
mined under this section . . . for any month of coverage before the first month the State 
establishing the exchange has in effect the insurance rating reforms . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 
111-89, at 48 (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT- 111srpt89/pdf/CRPT-
111srpt89.pdf (“If a State has not yet adopted the reformed rating rules, qualifying 
small business employers in the State are not eligible to receive the credit.”).
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costs in the individual market, while depriving them of tax credits to 
subsidize insurance purchases. This is because Section 36B requires 
individuals to earn at least 100 percent of the federal poverty line 
to be eligible for subsidies.139 It also remains the case that a state’s 
refusal to participate in traditional Medicaid would eliminate sub-
sidies for the poorest of the poor. One cannot reasonably argue it is 
implausible that Congress would give states the power to “destroy” 
coverage for 8.5 million moderate-income individuals when it is un-
disputed that Congress gave and continues to give states the power 
to destroy coverage for 50 million low-income individuals.
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that it is “implausible” that Con-
gress could have intended Section 36B to work as written is simply 
false. ACA supporters offered too many similar proposals to claim 
Congress could not have meant what it said in Section 36B.140
Beyond the health care context, Congress often enacts laws that 
rely upon state cooperation, and that risk severe adverse conse-
quences should states fail to comply. It often enacts statutes with 
conflicting goals; the ACA contains conflicting goals in its very 
title. It often enacts legislation that undermines its stated goals or 
upsets the expectations of individual legislators.141 Environmental 
law is replete with such examples, including pollution-control laws 
that increase pollution142 and species-conservation laws that under-
mine species conservation.143 It is indisputable that portions of the 
ACA undermine other stated goals and produce results that some 
139  See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting definition of “applicable taxpayer” eligible 
for tax credits).
140  See Brief of Amici Curiae Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon at 22–28, 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114). 
141  See generally, Steven M. Gillon, That’s Not What We Meant to Do: Reform and Its 
Unintended Consequences in the Twentieth Century (2000).
142  One of the best-known examples is documented in Bruce Ackerman & William 
Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar 
Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers (1981); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fu-
els, Dirty Air, in Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards (1992).
143  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental 
Consequences of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. Rev. (2008); Jonathan 
H. Adler, Introduction to Rebuilding the Ark: New Perspectives on Endangered Spe-
cies Act Reform (Jonathan H. Adler, ed., 2011).
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supporters failed to anticipate, such as when the law threw millions 
out of their existing insurance plans.144
What is unique about the ACA was not that Congress passed a 
law with conflicting goals, or that the law threatened to withhold 
valuable benefits and impose a more punitive regulatory structure 
on non-cooperating states, but that so many states refused to cooper-
ate. Moreover, as the large number of state amici supporting the King 
petitioners illustrates, many states preferred that deal to the one the 
majority offers them.145
Ironically, the Court’s reliance upon its predetermined sense of 
“Congress’s plan” may doom one of Congress’s goals. As the New 
York Times noted just after the decision was released, King may have 
“killed state-based exchanges.”146 This is because, absent the threat of 
losing tax credits, the ACA offers states minimal inducement for the 
difficult and thankless task of creating and operating exchanges.147 
The idea that Congress conditioned tax credits on state cooperation, 
under the assumption that most (if not all) states would fall quickly 
into line, is more plausible than the idea Congress enacted a law 
encouraging federal exchanges in every state. Indeed, some senators 
144  See Angie Drobnic Holan, Lie of the Year: ‘If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You 
Can Keep It,’ PolitiFact (Dec. 12, 2013, 4:44 PM). This example, in particular, shows 
that many who supported the ACA in Congress either did not understand the law 
for which they voted, or were willing to deliberately misrepresent it in order to en-
sure its passage. Either way, the frequency with which members of Congress and the 
president were willing to say “if you like your health insurance plan, you can keep it” 
should illustrate the danger of relying upon “Congress’s plan” when it is not embod-
ied in the text of the statute at issue.
145  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Indiana and 39 Indiana Public School Corpora-
tions, King. v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief of Amici Curiae Okla-
homa, et al., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
146  See Margot Sanger-Katz, Obamacare Ruling May Have Just Killed State-Based 
Exchanges, The Upshot, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/26/upshot/obamacare-ruling-may-have-just-killed-state-based-ex-
changes.html?abt=0002&abg=0.
147  Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, High Costs Plague Some State-Run Health Insurance 
Markets, Associated Press (Jul. 27, 2015) (“Now that the Supreme Court has ruled the 
Obama administration can keep subsidizing premiums in all 50 states through Health-
Care.gov, no longer is there a downside for states turning to Washington . . . The pen-
dulum probably will swing toward a greater federal role in the next couple of years, 
said Jim Wadleigh, director of Connecticut’s Access Health.”). 
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who voted for the ACA made clear that was an option they would 
not support. And yet that is the law King gives us.148
VII. Chevron’s Domain vs. King’s Dominion
As noted above, the Court’s King opinion rests on its conclusion 
that the relevant statutory language, when read in context, is ambigu-
ous. Under normal circumstances, this would mean the government 
wins under step two of the Chevron doctrine, which provides that 
when a statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to the interpreta-
tion of the implementing agency. Not here. Instead, the chief justice 
explained, resolving the ambiguity was the job of the Court because 
the underlying question—whether tax credits are available for the 
purchase of health insurance in federally established exchanges—
was sufficiently “extraordinary,” and of such “deep economic and 
political significance,” that it should not be left to an administrative 
agency, particularly one (like the IRS) lacking “expertise in crafting 
health insurance policy of this sort.”149 This meant that it was up to 
the Court to resolve the ambiguity it had discovered in the ACA, in 
this case by molding the relevant language to conform to the Court’s 
understanding of Congress’s plan.
There was precedent for the Court’s refusal to apply Chevron defer-
ence. The Supreme Court similarly refused to defer to the Food and 
Drug Administration on whether tobacco could be regulated under 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act150 and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency on whether greenhouse gases constituted “pollutants” 
under the Clean Air Act.151 The chief justice had also urged a narrow 
conception of Chevron’s domain in City of Arlington v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission, though in dissent.152
148  See Marc Levy, Penn. Withdraws Its Healthcare Marketplace Plan After Supreme 
Court Ruling, Insurance Journal (June 26, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/east/2015/06/26/373202.htm; Randall Chase, Delaware Opts Against Setting 
Up State Health Insurance Exchange, Insurance Journal (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/east/2015/08/10/378007.htm (“The court’s ruling 
upholding the subsidies in all states—not just those operating their own exchanges 
—was a major factor”). 
149  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (citation omitted).
150  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000).
151  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007).
152  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The rationale for refusing to apply Chevron deference in such cases 
is that such deference is only appropriate where Congress would 
have wanted the implementing agency to exercise such authority. 
That is, agencies get Chevron deference when a statute is ambiguous 
and it is reasonable to believe Congress meant to delegate interpre-
tive authority to the agency. Based on his City of Arlington dissent, it 
seems that the chief justice is committed to this principle. Whether a 
consistent majority of the Court concurs is an open question.153
The chief justice was unwilling to presume Congress had dele-
gated the IRS authority to construe provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, because Congress had failed to expressly delegate such 
authority. Yet he had little difficulty presuming that Congress had 
authorized the payment of billions of dollars in refundable tax cred-
its, not to mention the resulting penalties, without expressly provid-
ing so. Such authorization was to be found, if at all, in Congress’s 
unstated “plan.” What makes this inconsistency all the more strik-
ing is the Court’s failure to engage with the precedents expressly 
counseling against assuming that Congress authorizes expenditures 
or tax benefits obliquely.154 
Electing not to apply Chevron in King also allowed the majority 
to sidestep the fact that the IRS had never provided much of an 
explanation for its rule. As noted above, the IRS offered no more 
than a cursory and conclusory justification for its interpretation of 
Section 36B, failing to provide any substantive response to critical 
public comments on the proposed rule. Compared with the sort of 
legal analysis that typically accompanies important rulemakings of 
this type, the IRS’s concise statement was utterly lacking. Under the 
153  The same may be true of Justice Kennedy, who authored Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General’s interpretation of “legitimate med-
ical purpose” under the Controlled Substance Act did not merit Chevron deference). 
Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s broad application of 
Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC and Justice Breyer concurred in the result. 
Of those joining the King majority, only Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice Roberts’s 
dissent.
154  See, e.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988) (citing “the 
settled principle that exemptions from taxation are not to be implied; they must be 
unambiguously proved”); see also Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 
174, 183 (1889) (holding that tax credits and the like “must be expressed in clear and 
unambiguous terms”).
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traditional standards of judicial review of agency action, it is hard to 
see how what the IRS did could constitute reasoned decisionmaking.
In other words, the IRS expanded its power by doing the opposite 
of what the ACA says, provided no justification until forced to do so 
by Congress and the courts, for years thereafter offered a constantly 
shifting series of post-hoc rationalizations, and still got away with 
it. The solicitor general’s claim that “established by the State” was 
an undefined statutory term of art, for example, made its first ap-
pearance in the government’s merits brief before the Supreme Court, 
years after the IRS rule was finalized. By assuming the role of final 
interpreter for itself, the Court was able to uphold the substance of 
the IRS rule without passing judgment on the IRS’s manifestly un-
reasonable rulemaking.155
While this approach to Chevron did not come at the expense of the 
administration’s preferred outcome in King, it may hamper other ad-
ministrative initiatives in the future. As commentators have already 
noted, this aspect of the King decision gives opponents of agency 
action a new arrow for their legal quivers.156 When confronted with 
particularly ambitious agency interpretations, challengers can argue 
the question at issue should not be left to the agency—and the higher 
the stakes, the more compelling this argument will be. One exam-
ple of where King could affect other agencies is the Environmental 
155  This also enabled the Court to avoid confronting the “fundamental rule of ad-
ministrative law” that courts “must judge the propriety” of agency actions “solely by 
the grounds invoked by the agency.” See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). As 
the Chenery Court explained, courts have no warrant for substituting their arguments 
for those offered by the agency:
If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to af-
firm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more 
adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain 
which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Id. at 196.
156  See Chris Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for Administrative Law, Notice 
& Comment, Yale J. Reg. (June 25, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/what-king-
v-burwell-means-for-administrative-law-by-chris-walker; The Obamacare Sidestep: 
Professor Freedman on King v. Burwell, Environmental Law Program (June 2015), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/the-chevron-sidestep/; Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Catch in the Obamacare Opinion, Bloomberg View (June 25, 2015), http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-25/the-catch-in-the-obamacare-opinion.
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Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan.157 So while many in the 
Obama administration cheered the outcome in King, the Court’s 
rationale may have given officials in some agencies something to 
worry about. Then again, it remains to be seen whether there really 
are five consistent votes on the Court for this approach. 
VIII. Altering the Deal
King was not the first time that the chief justice would stretch the 
ACA’s text in service of his notion of how the statute should read. 
Roberts’s opinion in NFIB adopted multiple saving constructions of 
the statutory text so as to overcome potential constitutional infirmi-
ties. The result, as in King, was a statute quite different from the one 
Congress actually enacted.
One of the most controversial aspects of the ACA is the so-called 
“individual mandate”—a requirement that individuals obtain quali-
fying health insurance or pay a penalty. Roberts’s controlling opin-
ion in NFIB found the individual mandate as written—a command 
imposed under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce—
to be unconstitutional.158 Roberts nevertheless declined to invalidate 
the provision because he concluded that the assessment for noncom-
pliance could be characterized as a “tax” and therefore justified as 
a use of Congress’s taxing power.159 That Congress termed the as-
sessment a penalty instead of a tax—and that the ACA’s supporters 
repeatedly disclaimed that the penalty was a “tax” because it would 
not have passed otherwise—was not enough to let the plain text of 
the law guide Roberts’s understanding. 
Nor did it matter that this interpretation could constrain the indi-
vidual mandate’s operation in the future: Roberts concluded that the 
assessment could be considered a tax rather than a penalty because 
the amount was significantly less than the cost of buying coverage, 
and therefore was not large enough to coerce individuals into pur-
chasing health insurance.160 But that means that the mandate will be 
157  See Jonathan H. Adler, Could King v. Burwell Spell Bad News for the EPA?, The 
Volokh Conspiracy, Wash. Post (July 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/03/could-king-v-burwell-spell-bad-news-
for-the-epa/.
158  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012).
159  Id.
160  Id. at 2595–96.
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less effective in fulfilling its stated purpose of preventing adverse 
selection.161 If the assessment is significantly less than the cost of 
purchasing qualifying health insurance, many uninsured individu-
als will lack a sufficient incentive to purchase insurance before they 
are sick. The logical response to this problem would be to increase 
the assessment, but Roberts’s NFIB opinion limits Congress’s ability 
to do so because—at some unknown amount—a higher assessment 
ceases to be a constitutional tax and becomes an unconstitutional 
penalty.162 This may have made sense to the chief justice at the time, 
but it is hard to square with either the statutory text or the statutory 
purpose he described in King.163
Roberts also took liberties with the ACA’s text in upholding the 
Medicaid expansion. Like six of his colleagues, the chief justice con-
cluded that it was unconstitutional for Congress to condition a state’s 
receipt of all Medicaid funding on acceptance of the ACA’s Medic-
aid expansion.164 Leveraging longstanding state participation in the 
Medicaid program, and reliance upon significant federal support, 
was impermissibly coercive. 
Rather than invalidate the Medicaid expansion in its entirety, how-
ever—let alone the ACA as a whole—the chief justice opted to rewrite 
the relevant ACA provisions to separate the old Medicaid program 
from the new. Although Congress had constructed the Medicaid ex-
pansion as an extension of the existing program by simply includ-
ing the expansion among the conditions imposed on receipt of all 
Medicaid funds, the chief justice concluded that these were in fact 
two separate programs that states could consider separately. The rel-
evant statutory language was effectively replicated, with one version 
continuing to set conditions on receipt of old Medicaid funds and 
another version incorporating the conditions of the Medicaid expan-
sion. Here again, the chief justice’s opinion adopted an interpreta-
tion of the ACA at odds with the relevant statutory language in the 
161  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486 (“Congress adopted a coverage requirement to ‘minimize 
this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy in-
dividuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.’” (citing 42 U. S. C. § 18091(2)
(I))).
162  See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why 
Did so Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1331, 1339 (2013).
163  Cf. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–87.
164  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07.
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name of a never-expressed congressional plan. Again, Roberts ad-
opted an interpretation that undermined the purpose of the relevant 
provisions; since NFIB, dozens of states have declined to implement 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion—which the ACA’s supporters clearly 
sought to ensure in all 50 states.165 By decoupling the Medicaid ex-
pansion from the continued receipt of traditional Medicaid funding, 
the chief justice made it much easier for states to refuse to participate 
in the expansion.166
In NFIB the chief justice took liberties with the statutory text, even 
at the expense of statutory purpose, to prevent the ACA’s constitu-
tional infirmities from dooming the statute. In King, he took liberties 
with the text to prevent the ACA’s political and operational infirmi-
ties from frustrating “Congress’s plan.” In so doing, the chief justice 
revealed that his willingness to stretch statutory text is not confined 
to cases of constitutional avoidance, and that providing a statute that 
“works” is as much a job for the courts as it is for Congress.
There is no indication in the statute or its legislative history that 
it was part of Congress’s plan to enact an inflexible tax rather than 
a flexible penalty; or to offer states a choice of either implement-
ing the Medicaid expansion or preserving the status quo ante; or to 
make tax credits available in federal exchanges. The only “plan” that 
makes sense of Roberts’s saving constructions is a desire to prevent 
the ACA’s constitutional, political, and operational infirmities from 
threatening its survival. 
165  PPACA proponents emphasized that the Medicaid expansion was not a new pro-
gram, but a change to the existing Medicaid program, which every state had imple-
mented. See Brief of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Democratic Leader 
Nancy Pelosi, and Congressional Leaders and Leaders of Committees of Relevant 
Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents (Medicaid) at 6, NFIB v. Sebel-
ius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, (2012) (No. 11-400). This is the only way to understand the purpose 
of the minimum income requirement for tax credit eligibility. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
166  See Noam N. Levey, Court’s Decision Could Widen Medicaid Gap, L.A. Times, 
June 29, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/29/nation/la-
na-court-impact-20120629; Stacey Butterfield, Changes to Medicaid Divide States, 
Doctors, ACP Internist (2013), http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2013/10/
medicaid.htm (quoting Sara Wilensky as saying “the toughest thing about Medicaid 
expansion, post-Supreme Court decision, is that what was supposed to be uniform 
across the country is now being decided on a state-by-state basis.”). As of July 20, 2105, 
19 states had refused to expand Medicaid under the PPACA.
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IX. Conclusion
Whether the members of Congress who supported the ACA were 
aware of it or not, “the most natural reading of the pertinent statu-
tory phrase” shows they voted to present states with a choice. States 
could either create health insurance exchanges, in which case eli-
gible citizens would receive tax credits, and many individuals and 
employers who failed to purchase coverage would face penalties, or 
states could choose not to create exchanges, in which case residents 
would receive no subsidies, but face fewer penalties. Like the choice 
Congress presented states via the Medicaid expansion, this choice 
was stark. No doubt few in Congress anticipated states would act 
like “separate and independent sovereigns” and “defend their pre-
rogatives by adopting the simple expedient of not yielding to federal 
blandishments.”167 What makes the ACA unique is not that it offered 
states this sort of choice, but that a majority of states chose not to 
cooperate. 
Chief Justice Roberts framed the Court’s King ruling as a service 
to “democracy.” “[I]n every case,” he wrote, the Court “must respect 
the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has 
done.”168 Yet that is precisely what the majority did. By elevating an 
unexpressed congressional plan over the plan Congress expressly 
laid out in statute, the majority altered the deal Congress offered 
states. Indeed, the Court went to great lengths to do so.
Reaching its conception of Congress’s plan required the majority 
to change the meaning of “established by the State” from its natu-
ral or plain meaning; to change the meaning of that phrase in some 
parts of the statute but not others; to treat a universal definition as 
conditional, and a conditional definition as universal; to conclude 
that Congress would allow adverse selection in long-term-care in-
surance, but not health insurance; to ignore that Congress indeed 
tolerated significant adverse selection in health insurance; to isolate 
select statutory text for the purpose of casting doubt on the operative 
text; to ignore all other text and context that eliminate such doubts; 
to rely on legislative history that supported its understanding of 
Congress’s plan, but ignore legislative history that supports the plain 
167  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
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meaning; and to make broad assumptions about the way Congress 
legislates that are contrary to what we actually observe.
If it is “possible” to interpret “established by the State” to mean 
“established by the State or federal government,” are there any pro-
visions of the ACA that cannot be rewritten to fulfill “what we see as 
Congress’s plan”? The ACA explicitly denies tax credits to those who 
purchase coverage outside of an exchange, to many dependents who 
do not have access to “affordable” employer coverage,169 and even 
to those with incomes below 100 percent of the poverty line, many 
of whom aren’t eligible for Medicaid. If “Congress’s plan” is simply 
to “improve health insurance markets,” should those limitations on 
tax-credit eligibility stand in the way? Should the IRS disregard all 
ACA provisions that limit eligibility for tax credits? Will the Court 
ratify those revisions of the statute? 
These questions are not academic. The IRS has already expanded 
eligibility for tax credits to certain undocumented immigrants, in-
dividuals below 100 percent of the poverty line, and others in di-
rect contravention of the clear limits imposed by Section 36B.170 Is 
pretending that 99 percent is greater than 100 percent also part of 
Congress’s plan? Those tax credits will trigger penalties against em-
ployers. Must those employers also pay taxes from which the ACA 
clearly exempts them? 
The only answer the majority provides—the only limitation it en-
visions on the judicial power to override plain text in the service of 
“what we see as Congress’s plan”—is what is “at all possible.” That 
stands in stark contrast to the rule laid out by five of the six justices 
in the King majority just one year earlier:
[T]his Court does not revise legislation…just because the text 
as written creates an apparent anomaly as to some subject it 
does not address. Truth be told, such anomalies often arise 
from statutes…Rejecting a similar argument that a statutory 
anomaly…made “not a whit of sense,” we explained in one 
recent case that “Congress wrote the statute it wrote”—
169  Tricia Brooks, The Family Glitch, Health Affairs, Nov. 10, 2014, available at http://
www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=129 (“Some low-to-mod-
erate-income families may be locked out of receiving financial assistance to purchase 
health coverage through the Marketplaces.”). 
170  See, e.g., Andy S. Grewal, Lurking Challenges to the ACA Tax Credit Regulations, 
Bloomberg BNA Tax Insights, 98 DTR J-1 (May 2015).
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meaning, a statute going so far and no further. . . . This Court 
has no roving license, in even ordinary cases of statutory 
interpretation, to disregard clear language simply on the view 
that…Congress “must have intended” something broader.171
It is also not much of a limitation. If judges may deprive select 
words of all meaning, construe select phrases to mean their oppo-
site, ignore Congress’s express instructions, and treat text, context, 
legislative history, and a statute’s competing purposes as buffets 
from which they may select only the items that serve “what we see 
as Congress’s plan,” then judges will find very little is impossible. It 
remains to be seen whether this approach to statutory interpretation 
will be applied across the board, or is limited to the law “[w]e should 
start calling . . . SCOTUSCare.”172 
The Court’s decision to disregard Congress’s express plan has 
deprived states of a power Congress granted them, and that many 
states were eager to use. It has altered the balance of power between 
the federal government and the states. It has reduced democratic ac-
countability for the ACA, and perhaps other acts of Congress. It has 
subjected tens of millions of employers and individuals to penalties 
from which the ACA plainly exempts them.173 And it creates uncer-
tainty about whether citizens can trust that federal statutes mean 
what they say.174
171  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033–34 (2014) (internal 
citations omitted).
172  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2497 (“[N]ormal 
rules of interpretation seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present 
Court: The Affordable Care Act must be saved.”). Cf. Ilya Shapiro, Scalia’s Obama- 
care Argument Is Stronger Than Roberts’, CNN.com, June 26, 2015, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/06/26/opinions/shapiro-supreme-court-obamacare (“Scalia renamed the 
law at issue ‘SCOTUScare,’ but really it deserves the moniker RobertsCare.”).
173  See Michael F. Cannon, Benefits Of ‘King v. Burwell’: More Jobs, Higher Incomes 
& 70 Million Freed From Illegal Taxes, Forbes.com (June 24, 2015); Michael F. Cannon, 
King v. Burwell Expanded Obamacare Even More Than You Know, National Review 
Online (July 29, 2015). 
174  See Star Wars supra note 1 (“This deal is getting worse all the time.”); see also 
Robot Chicken: Star Wars Episode II (Adult Swim broadcast, Nov. 16, 2008), https://
youtu.be/WpE_xMRiCLE (illustrating the perils of post hoc deal alterations).  
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